Introduction
The Sovereign Military Order of St John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta, also known as the Order of Malta, the Order of St John of Jerusalem, or simply the Hospitallers, is a unique international confraternity. It is the only organisation currently recognised, albeit by a minority of states, as quasi-sovereign. In view of the claims which have been made from time to time by other orders of chivalry -or even pretended orders -to such status, it is worthwhile looking more closely at the claims made by or on behalf of the Order of Malta. In so doing we may help to locate the origin and nature of this so-called sovereignty, and answer the question of which orders of chivalry are likewise 'sovereign', or, indeed, whether the Order of Malta itself is truly sovereign.
The article begins with a brief look at the concepts of sovereignty and statehood as traditionally understood. A survey is then made of the origins of what might be called anomalous entities -bodies which have some status at international law, but which are not traditional states. The special position of the Holy See is covered. The case of the Order of Malta is then examined in its historical context, and the basis for its claimed sovereignty assessed. The position of branches of the Order, and of other ancient religious orders is looked at. The lessons from the example of the Order of Malta for the relationship of territory and statehood are evaluated.
Sovereignty and statehood
The notions of sovereignty and statehood were once among the most important aspects of public international law. Its heyday was perhaps in the late nineteenth century, when sovereign states enjoyed almost unfettered independence of action. These were subject only to the regulation of their diplomatic and military action, principally by the Law of Armed Conflict, or the Laws of War. I The traditional juristic theory of territorial sovereignty, with the King being supreme ruler within the confines of his kingdom, originated as two distinct concepts. The King acknowledged no superior in temporal matters, and within his kingdom the King was emperor.
2 If the Holy Roman Emperor had legal supremacy within the terrae imperii, the confines of the empire, theories of the sovereignty of kings were not needed, for they had merely de facto power.
3 Sovereignty remained essentially de jure authority.4 This was not merely power without legitimacy.5 Mediaeval jurists cared not whether the emperor had jurisdiction and authority over kings and princes, but focused on his power to usurp the rights of his subjects. Whether this power was de facto or de jure was unimportant. , In Roman law it was originally considered that the emperor's power had been bestowed upon him by the people, but when Rome became a Christian State his power was regarded as coming from God. In America also God had been recognized as the source of government, although it is commonly thought in a republican or democratic government 'all power is inherent in the people'. This dual basis of authority is symbolised by chapter 25 verse 10 of the Book of Leviticus, which was popular in the USA:
And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.
But to have sovereignty, a state must have a permanent population, it must have a defined territory, it must have a government, and it must have the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations. 7 No other entity could be regarded as a sovereign state, whatever its de facto power. The Order of Malta at one time met all these criteria for statehood, but does not do so now. It possesses a population, but not exclusively, as its 10,000 members are subjects and citizens of other nations. Its Government is accorded some diplomatic recognition and accredits representatives. But the major problem for the Order is that for two hundred years it has been effectively land-Iess. R This paper is the latest in a long series of attempts to explain the somewhat anomalous situation of the Order. 9 That this is an on-going controversy is the result of what Breycha-Vauthier and Potulicki called 'a somewhat regrettable confusion of the Order's permanent position as an international organisation and its role as a territorial Power'. 10 The character of the Order did not originate simultaneously with its territorial sovereignty, and therefore did not disappear with the latter. I 1 We must, therefore, be on guard against attaching too much significance to the characterisation of a particular entity as a 'state,.12 The Order may be sovereign in a sense, but not necessarily a state. , In accordance with the settlement with the Roman Catholic Church, the Italian Government recognizes the exterritoriality of the Order of Malta's property in Rome, the Palazzo Malta, Via dei Condotti 68 (where the Grand Master resides and the government bodies meet) and a villa in the Aventine, the Villa Malta, which houses the Grand Priory of Rome, The existence of anomalous entities having personality at international law Traditionally only a territorial state was regarded as an international person, capable of having rights and duties under international law. 13 That entities other than states can be subjects of international law is not even now a universally accepted idea, and exactly what entities do have this status is an even more controversial topic. As Hall has noted, primarily international law governs the relations of independent states, but 'to a limited extent ... it may also govern the relations of certain communities of analogous character' .14 Lawrence also wrote that the subjects of international law are sovereign states, 'and those other political bodies which, though lacking many of the attributes of sovereign states, possess some to such an extent as to make them real, but imperfect, international persons' .15 Whereas these scholars tended to define subjects of international law as states and certain unusual exceptions, there are others who go further in opening up the realm of reasonable subjects of the law of nations. Notable among them is Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. In his view:
'International practice shows that persons and bodies other than states are often made subjects of international rights and duties, that such developments are not inconsistent with the structure of international law and that in each particular case the question whether a person or a body is a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from the preconceived notion as to who can be the subjects of international law. ,16 13 Puhlic International Law regulates the relations between nations. The basic sources of international law are written and unwritten rules, treaties, agreements, and customary law. Custom is general state practice accepted as law. The elements of custom are a generalised repetition of similar acts by competent state authorities and a sentiment that such acts are juridically necessary to maintain and develop international relations. This paper involves a study of just such a case. The status of organisations in international law is less controversial than the assumption of rights and duties by individuals or groups of individuals. In 1949 the International Court of Justice recognized the United Nations as an international person,17 thereby beginning the process whereby an ever increasing number of modern international organisations are recognised as having personality at international law. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a state, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a state.
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While it is possible for organisations and individuals to be subjects of international law, states remain the dominant agents in world politics and the dominant actors in international law. This dominance has led some theorists to distinguish 'SUbjects' of the law from 'objects' of the law, suggesting that although entities other than states may have rights and duties in international law, these rights are conferred upon them by states and, presumably, may be taken away by states. 19 It is now more correct to regard international law as a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law.
20
There are now many international organisations, though not all of these are necessarily a subject of international law.
2l Whilst many such organisations, such as the European Union, or the United Nations Organisation, receive ambassadors from member countries, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (known as SMOM for short) almost alone among international organisations claims the right to send representatives to other 17 states for the purpose of carrying on diplomatic negotiations, as well as to receive representatives from other states for the same purpose. 22 Most importantly, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta claims, and is sometimes acknowledged to be, a sovereign state in its own right. 23 This status has been claimed since at least the fourteenth century, well before international law began to accord legal personality to international organisations. 24 But the Order is not unique in such claims. Its own parent body, the Holy See, has for long been regarded as sovereign, apparently even when the papacy was without territorial possessions.
The twentieth century, and particularly in the second half of the century, has seen the growth of international organisations and other bodies now accorded recognition as subjects on international law. With the growth in both the (horizontal) extent and (vertical) reach of international agreements, treaties, conventions and codes, national independence is becoming less relevant. This tendency is becoming more noticeable in the modern commercial environment, and especially the Internet.
Although the basic sources of international law, the written and unwritten rules, treaties, agreements, and customary law, have long been present, since the nineteenth century there has been enormous growth in the extent to which any country is now truly sovereign is debatable, given the growth in the scope and reach of internationallaw.
27
At the same time, non-countries have increasingly become subjects of international law, most noticeably, the United Nations. 28 It was perhaps inevitable that as the traditional sovereign state lost ground, so newer types of international entities, enjoying powers and privileges recognised by the international community, should emerge. Yet it is ironic that the first of these international organisations should date, not from the twentieth century, but from the twelfth.
The Holy See
The Holy See, the parent jurisdiction or court of the Roman Catholic Church, was a person in international law even before the Lateran Treaty of 11 February 1929/ 9 which restored to the papacy some of the lands lost in 1870. Its position is best explained by Hatschek:
'Since international law does not allow anyone state to control the Pope in his character as head of the Catholic Church, he has to be put in a position of international independence, that is, even though he is not the head of a state ... he has to be made an independent subject of internationallaw.,30
As we shall see, the international personality of the Order itself was to derive, at least in part, from this functional approach to law -one which accords nicely with the much more modern ideas of Lauterpacht. Yet the position of the Holy See itself was controversial until it once again obtained actual physical territory in 1929. But the Holy See marks the transition from independent subject of international law with an essential territorial origin, to that of an entirely different character. At times the Holy See has had a territorial basis, at other times it has not. Yet all the time, a considerable number of states have recognized the Holy See as a subject of international law. Though whether, in the absence of territory, it should be regarded as a state is another matter.
The Sovereign Military Order of Malta
The major features of the long history of the Order are well known. In the early eleventh century a hospice, served by a lay fraternity, was founded or restored in the city of Jerusalem. Its staff were bound by oath to serve the poor of the Holy Land. The hospital was later dedicated to St John the Baptist. In 1099, Brother Gerard, then head of the hospital, and who had aided the Crusaders in the capture of the Holy City, adopted the rule of the Augustinian canons in place of the former Benedictine rule. On 5 February 1113 the hospital was recognised by the Bull Pie Postulatio Voluntatis of Pope Paschal II as an autonomous religious Order, dedicated to serve the poor and sick. 31 This Bull was confirmed by Pope Calixtus II in 1120. Thereafter the Order spread outwards from Jerusalem, until there were hospitals, or houses of the Order, throughout Europe. 32 The Order had one convent (in the Holy Land), but they erected a hospital whenever they went. It is to the Order of Malta that we owe the survival of a public hospital service through the middle ages in Europe. 33 In its early years the Order remained purely eleemosynary in character. But due to the exigencies of the times, between 1126 and 1140 it assumed a military function, 'to defend the Holy Sepulchre to the last drop of blood and fight the unfaithful wherever they be'. of Jerusalem, in 1185, the castles of the kingdom were placed in the custody of the two military Orders. But unlike the Order of the Temple (the Templars), the Hospitallers were never a purely military body, and they also allowed women to become affiliated members.
The Order of St John withdrew from the Holy Land in 1291, when they established their convent on Cyprus. In 1310 they moved to Rhodes, which was to remain their home until 1523. After a time on Crete and elsewhere, in 1530 they reformed on Malta/ 4 their home till their power was finally broken with the arrival of the French in 1798. 35 On Rhodes and later Malta the Order had acquired and exercised sovereign authority, ruling the islands -at least in the early centuries-with an efficiency and vigour which were much to the advantage of the native inhabitants. Not the least of the Order's responsibilities was maintaining a small fleet for the suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean.
Attempts were occasionally made after 1798 to regain territory for the Order,36 but none succeeded. Although lacking a territorial base, the Order continued to maintain hospitals, as it still does. It also retained its public status in Germany as a member of the Holy Roman Empire, with voting rights in the College of Princes 37 and retained a vote in the College of Princes of the Empire. 38
Due to its weakened condition, the Order remained for some time in danger of dissolution, and it was governed by Lieutenant Grand Masters until 1871.
Only in 1879 did the Holy See authorise the election of a new Grand Master. 39 But throughout this time the Order maintained diplomatic relations with a number of countries, and, at least to some extent, preserved its sovereign status. 40 The Order of Malta is still recognized by many countriesthough by no means all, as a sovereign entity in international law. 41 The Order is not a country, but it exhibits some aspects of a sovereign state. 42
How did this ambiguous situation arise? The key is in its long history, and in the dual nature of the Order, as both order of chivalry and religious order. " It may previously have held certain rights within the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem which were analogous to those of sovereign states, but this is not certain; above n 10 ap 555.
certainly by 1313, in its possession of the islands of Rhodes. 45 In 1523 the Order lost possession of Rhodes, but not its sovereign territorial character, as it shortly thereafter acquired Malta. Perpetual sovereignty over Malta was granted in 1530 by the Emperor Charles V, as a perpetual fief cum imperio of the Kingdom of Sicily.46 Since 1834 the Order has been domiciled in Rome, where its headquarters, the Palazzo Malta, covers three acres. 47
As the rulers of Malta, the Order was regarded by contemporaries as a sovereign power. But did the loss of territory extinguish the independence, the sovereignty of the Order? Although sovereignty is not affected by loss of territory, complete loss would extinguish the state. 48 The principal question to be asked then is this: was it the Order which was an international person, or was it Malta? Thus, was the Grand Master a sovereign qua head of the Order, or qua head of the Maltese state?49 If the Order itself was the international person, then this status should continue undiminished despite the loss of Malta. Cansacchi thought that it was arguable that there was a personal union akin to that of the Pope, as occupant of the Holy See and sovereign of Vatican City State,50 but as the Grand Master was ruler of Malta solely as head of the Order,51 this argument appears weak.
But neither alternative (the Order itself or Malta being sovereign) is satisfactory. The reality -and early international law was nothing if not realistic was that the Order was an international person only because it 45 
G Cansacchi, La personalitd di diriuo internazionale del S.M. V Gerosolimitano deuo di Malta (nd) 8.
51 Above n 49 ap 222. possessed territory as a vassal of the Holy Roman Empire 52 and later of the Kingdom of Sicily.53 This can be seen in the lack of similar status being accorded the Templars 54 or the Iberian Orders, and its being conferred upon the Teutonic Order. 55 As, until the twentieth century, only a sovereign state could be a subject of international law, the Order could not have been such a subject in its own right. But the possession of Rhodes, and later Malta, gave it this status. The Grand Master of the Order was a sovereign prince as holder of a perpetual fief cum imperio of the Kingdom of Sicily, in the same way that the Archbishops of Mainz, Trier and Cologne were regarded as sovereign princes as feudatories of the Empire. 56 What is undeniable is the fact that after 1798 the Order still had an international legal personality, independent of specific territorial sovereignty.57 It would seem that the Order continued to be recognised as something akin to sovereign after 1798 for two major reasons. Firstly-in the earlier years at least-there was the distinct possibility that the Order might have recovered territory, and so its sovereignty, as it had done in 1530. 58 In this respect it might more appropriately be recognised as being equivalent to an exiled Government. Some of these, such as those of Poland and the Baltic States, were recognised by some countries for many years after they lost 1 f h . .
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contro 0 t elr terntory.-Secondly, due to its unique history and humanitarian function the Order acquired the then unique status of international legal personality after 1798. baThe Order as such was prohibited by its rules from fighting on any side in conflicts between Christian powers; Above n 10 ap 555. This did not equal the sovereignty which they possessed as masters of Malta, and which they must have lost some time after 1798 though the distinction between the two sources of authority soon became blurred. This personality was based on the role of the Order as one of the few international humanitarian organisations of its time. 61
Since the twelfth century the Order of Malta had been an international religious order or brotherhood. 62 It only gradually became an order of chivalry,63 and the possession of sovereign powers over island territories came comparatively late in its history. 64 The term ecclesiastical orders of knighthood describes those knightly orders which, in one way or another, were connected with the Catholic Church. At the present time there are two different groups: the pontifical orders of knighthood in the strict sense and a group of chivalric orders which derive from media;val military orders and continue to come under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 65
The pontifical or papal orders of knighthood are conferred directly by the pope. While the Templars were suppressed, due largely to jealousy of their wealth and privileges, the Hospitallers, always preserving an essential charitable function, survived.
75
The legal status of the Order of Malta within the Roman Catholic Church was defined with greater precision in 1951. Pope Pius XII, on 10 December of that year, appointed a special tribunal of five cardinals, presided over by the Dean of the Sacred College, Eugene Cardinal Tisserant, in order to determine the nature of the order and the extent of its competence both as a sovereign and as a religious institution, as well as its relationship to the Holy See. After long discussions the commission of cardinals on 24 January 1953 gave the following unanimous verdict: 76 The Order of Malta is a sovereign order, inasmuch as it enjoys certain prerogatives which, according to the principles of international law, are proper to sovereignty. These rights have been recognized by the Holy See and a number of states. However, these 71 1199 . 72 Founded 1099, re-organised 1496, revived 1868. 7J The Order of Alcantara (founded 1156, approved 1177), Order of Calatrava (founded 1158, recognized by the papacy 1164), Order of Santiago (or St James of Compostella) (founded 1170, canonically approved 1175), and the Order of Our Lady of Montesa (1317). The latter Order succeeded to the assets of the Templars in Spain, as well as to those of the Knights of Valencia. Each retains at least some religious attributes, though they were secularised from 1546. 74 Though the great majority of members are laymen. In some respects these members rather resembles the lay brothers of a monastery, or perhaps rather the corrodians, who obtained lodgings in a monastery in return for the payment of a suitable sum. Probably the most apposite comparisons however, is that of the lay abbots and similar creations of the post-Reformation Church.
75 To SOffie extent, the Order of St John exercised powers akin to sovereignty prior to obtaining territory. But, as international law was somewhat fluid at that time, it cannot be regarded, on its own, as a sufficient basis for presentday aspirations of sovereignty by the Order. rights do not comprise all the powers and prerogatives that belong to sovereign states in full sense of the word.
Insofar as the Order of Malta is composed of knights and chaplains, it is a 'religio' and more precisely a religious order, approved by the Holy See, according to the Codex juris canonici, Can. 487 and 488, nn 1 and 2. The purpose of this order is, besides the sanctification of its members, also the pursuit of religious objectives, charity, and welfare work.
The sovereign and the religious character of the order are intimately related, inasmuch as the former serves to attain the objectives of the order as a religious institution and its development in the world.
The Order of Malta depends on the Holy See and, as a religious order, on the Sacred Congregation of Religious.
Those persons who have obtained marks of distinction from the order and the associations of these persons depend on the order, and, through it, on the Holy See.
Questions concerning the institution's character as a sovereign order are treated by the Secretariat of State of His Holiness. Those of a mixed nature are received by the Sacred Congregation of Religious in accord with the Secretariat of State.
The present decisions do not interfere with the order's acquired rights, customs and privileges which the Popes have granted or recognised, insofar as they are still in force according to the norms of canon law 77 and the Order's own constitutions.
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The cardinalitial tribunal made clear in its decision released 19 February 1953, that the Order's sovereignty was 'functional', in that it was based on its international activities and not on the possession of territory. But, what does this 'sovereignty' mean? By 'functional sovereignty', the cardinalitial tribunal seems to have meant little more than de facto and de jure independence from the Church, and recognition by a number of states. In other words, this was personality in international law, not sovereignty, and justified by the international work of the religious order.
In 1961 the Sovereign Military Order of Malta promulgated a new Constitutional Charter and Code. This was revised by an Extraordinary Chapter-General 28-30 April 1997. 79 Inter alia, this provides:
The Order is a subject of international law and exercises sovereign functions. 80
The religious nature of the Order does not prejudice the exercise of sovereign prerogatives pertaining to the Order in so far as it is recognised by States as a subject of Internationallaw. 81
However, internal rules cannot of themselves make an otherwise nonsovereign body sovereign; though states can recognise only what the Order claims for itself. If the Order of Malta is sovereign, it is so only because of the recognition of international law. Such recognition is not generally accorded, but the Order is widely accepted as an international entity with unusually wide privileges.
So far as canon law is concerned the Order remains sovereign. But canon law does not overrule the municipal laws of states. Sovereignty recognised by the papacy has canonical validity.82 But it will lack validity in international law, since canon law is not universally accepted as a norm of international law.
The international personality of the Order of Malta was however upheld by the Italian Court of Cassation in 1935:
Sovereignty is a complex notion, which international law, from the external standpoint, contemplates, so to speak, negatively, having only in view independence viz-a-viz other States ... It is impossible to deny to other international collective units a limited capacity of acting internationally within the ambit and the actual exercise of their 79 Letter to the author from Jose Antonio Linati-Bosch, Ambassador of the Order of Malta to the United Nations, 20 May 1999. own functions, with the resulting international juridical personality and capacity which is its necessary and natural corollary.83
Although it too uses the term sovereignty, the Court of Cassation seems to have meant merely that the Order had 'international juridical personality,.84 Neither the cardinalitial tribunal in 1953, nor the Court of Cassation in 1935 accorded recognition to the Order of Malta as a state. Both seem rather to be recognising a precocious development of international personality.
In 1959 the Office of the Legal Adviser of the US Government asserted that:
[t]he United States, on its part, does not recognise the Order as a State. 85
The Office of the Legal Adviser of the US Government is right to assert that the Order is not a state. Although sovereignty is not affected by loss of territory, complete loss would extinguish the state. Many countries accord it diplomatic recognition, but, as with the United Nations, this does not amount to recognition of full sovereign status. But it can be recognised as a non-state entity subject to international law, which is what the Constitutional Charter and Code of the Order appears to indicate.
The privileges actually claimed or exercised by the Order appear to confirm this. It exercises, to some extent, the privilege of treaty-making. 86 It issues passports,87 but these also are not universally recognized. They do not, R3 [1935] [1936] [1937] Its right to mint coins and issue stamps is confined to an ornamentalleve1. 89
Nanni and Others v Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta
The Grand Master of the Order is however entitled to sovereign immunity, as is his residence,9o and is accorded appropriate status on official visits to some countries. 91
The Order is represented on international bodies. 92 The Order is a signatory to, though not a member of, the Universal Postal Union,93 although other non-sovereign entities are also members or associate members. n Membership of international bodies, even of the United Nations, is not regarded as ipso facto evidence of sovereignty, though full membership of the latter organisation would be compelling. 9J Letter to the author from Naguib Nermine, Universal Postal Union, 17 May 1999. 94 The Netherlands Antilles, and United Kingdom Overseas Territories. The former Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, while members of the Soviet Union, were also members of both the Universal Postal Union and of the United Nations, though their actual political independence was strictly prescribed.
'" Letter to the author from Jose Antonio Linati-Bosch, Ambassador of The right to accredit diplomatic missions is known as the right of legation, or ius legationis. The only comparable non-territorial body claiming a similar right is the Holy See, and that is now a territorial state as well as a worldwide religious body/OJ though it was without territory between 1870 and 1929. The status of the Order's diplomats was confirmed in a wartime Hungarian case. 102 But even the right of legation is not conclusive evidence that an entity is sovereign, as any international organisation can accredit representatives to other organisations or to states. What is unusual is the antiquity and continuity of the Order, and its existence in an age in which the Church itself was the only truly international organisation.
Although the Sovereign Military Order of Malta maintains diplomatic relations with many countries, and has maintained such relations for centuries, this, of itself is no guarantee of sovereign status. Today many international organisations are recognised as personalities in international law, though they do not claim sovereign status. The Order of Malta is equivalent to such bodies. While the Order was ruling on Rhodes and Malta it was a sovereign Order because it possessed territory over which it exercised at least de facto sovereignty. After 1798 it became the first of the organisations recognised by international law as having a separate legal personality. The Order itself is not however a state, nor can it be said to be sovereign, as that term is understood in traditional, nineteenth century, terms. Peculiarities of status can be explained by the ancient origins of the Order. As such, they must be considered the sole possessors to historic continuity, though only the Sovereign and Military Order of Malta can claim sovereignty in any sense by which that term may be used. Although the daughter Orders also operate beyond the territory of anyone country, they do not, unlike the Order of Malta, enjoy the status at international law of being a legal person, or international organisation. Neither the Templars, nor less well-known orders, 103 The Jesuits, though similarly a worldwide religious order was never recognised as sovereign, though it established and controlled an almost independent theocratic state of its own under the nominal sovereignty of Spain in Paraguay 1609-1766; above n 54 ap vol 2, 36-37.
'04 A convention is a pact or agreement between several states in the nature of a treaty. The term is usually applied to agreements for the regulation of matters of common interest, particularly of a technical nature. 1115 The branch of the Order descended from that in England, and revived in the United Kingdom in 1831. such as the St Lazarus, ever achieved sovereign status, as they never obtained control of territory108. The Teutonic Order lost its sovereign status when it ceased to rule territory in Germany after 1525. 109 
Conclusion -territory and statehood
The Order of Malta owes it peculiar status to having been possessor of the fiefdom of Malta for two hundred years, and of Rhodes even earlier. But after it ceased to rule Malta, it retained certain attributes of sovereignty, at a time when international law was slowly developing new concepts of statehood. This was due in part to the circumstances of the time Gust as the continued recognition of the Baltic states by the USA was a consequence of the Cold War), but also because the Order was the oldest and most prestigious of the hospitaller religious orders of the Catholic Church. These two factors, which quickly became intermingled, preserved for the Order a marked degree of independence, and placed it amongst the first of the international organisations to be recognised by international law. Not, indeed, as a sovereign state, but as a subject of international law with some powers and duties akin to those enjoyed by states.
To have sovereignty, a state must have a permanent population, it must have a defined territory, it must have a government, and it must have the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations. l1O No other entity could be regarded as a sovereign state, whatever its de facto power. Yet, this definition is increasingly meaningless.
The notions of sovereignty and statehood are not easily defined or explained. To a large degree this is because they are principally political concepts, rather than merely legal principles. With the growth in both the (horizontal) extent and (vertical) reach of international agreements, treaties, conventions and codes, national independence is becoming less relevant.
This tendency is becoming more noticeable in the modern commercial environment, and especially the Internet.
As the concept of state sovereignty declines in relevance, so notions of racial sovereignty have grown. The idea that a given population group is, or ought to be, sovereign within a larger country is not confined to New Zealand. 111 Yet, sovereign states have clung tenaciously to their rights, rights which have become more precious as they become rarer.
It was perhaps inevitable that as the traditional sovereign state lost ground, so newer types of international entities, enjoying powers and privileges recognised by the international community, should emerge. Yet it is ironic that the first of these international organisations should date, not from the twentieth century, but from the twelfth.
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